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Clark v. Martinez: Striking a Balance Between United
States Security and Due Process Rights of Illegal
Immigrants
By Michelle Mitsuye Shimasaki *
I. INTRODUCTION
They just lock us up and throw away the key. It's like
a people business for them. They don't care about us.
They have beds here and it's like they're losing
business unless they fill up the beds. So they just keep
us locked down . . . I understand that I made a
mistake, but I already did my time for that. Here I
don't even know how much time I have to do. The law
doesn't make any difference for us. It just doesn't
make any sense.1
• J.D. Candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law, 2007. B.A. Political
Science and B.A. Psychology, 2003, University of California, Irvine. I would like
to thank my Mom, Dad, Michael, and Andrew for their love, prayers, and
encouragement. Mike, thank you for your love, patience, and understanding. I
would also like to give thanks to God for His grace, mercy, faithfulness and
unconditional love.
1. Michelle Carey, Comment, "You Don 't Know if They'll Let You Out in One
Day, One Year, or Ten Years... " Indefinite Detention of Immigrants After
Zadvydas v. Davis, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 12, 12 (2003).
This is how Sergio Martinez characterizes indefinite detention.
As of my interview with him on October 19, 2001, just weeks
after the events of September 11 th, Mr. Martinez had already
been incarcerated at the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Processing Center in San Pedro, California, (hereinafter "San
Pedro SPC"), for over ten months. An Afro-Cuban who arrived in
the United States as part of the "Mariel Boatlift" in 1980, Mr.
Martinez moved to Fresno soon after his arrival. He has been in
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The issue of what to do with inadmissible aliens who are non-
removable has been a question that, until recently, had been left
unanswered. Once an inadmissible alien, an alien who has illegally
entered the country or who has not gained admission into the United
States, commits a crime, the dilemma begins. The dilemma is: what
should the United States do with this alien? The first recourse will
often be to try and deport the alien to their country of origin, but
sometimes this proves to be impossible because there is no
repatriation agreement with the country, or because the country the
United States wants to deport the alien to simply refuses to admit the
alien into their country.2 Once the inadmissible alien has finished
serving their sentence in a United States prison, the question is
whether the United States can simply hold the alien indefinitely.3 In
the past, the rights of the alien and the security concerns of the
United States were left out in the open. There were those activists
who argued that aliens also had due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment, and there were those who counter-argued for the
security of the United States and its citizens.4 The United States
Supreme Court decided to answer these concerns and questions in the
Clark v. Martinez case. 5
This case note examines the Clark v. Martinez decision. 6
Martinez is a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding habeas
corpus proceedings involving the indefinite detention of illegal aliens
within the United States.7 The decision by the Court in Martinez was
the United States since he was twenty-one years old. He is now
forty-five.
Id. at 12-13.
*Author's Note: I tried to find out whether the Sergio Martinez quoted here is
the same Sergio Martinez as the one in the Clark v. Martinez case. I was able to
locate the author of the article, yet we were unable to determine whether this was
the same Sergio Martinez. I would like to thank Ms. Carey for her time and help in
this matter.
2. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 686 (2001).
3. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371543 U.S. 371, 371-73 (2005).
4. See Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385-86, 727 and Carey, supra note 1, at 12.
5. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 372-73. The term habeas corpus is defined as "[a] writ employed to
bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's
greatly influenced by the Court's previous decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis.8 The Court in Martinez chose to expand the ruling in the
Zadvydas case, examining its ruling of that case in greater detail, and
relating it to the case at hand.9
Part II of this paper will examine the background of the Martinez
case, and also provide insight into the relevant statutes and case law
which have shaped the Court's decision.' 0 Part III will look at the
specific facts of the Martinez case." Part IV will analyze and
critique Justice Scalia's majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion of the
case.' 2 Part V will look at the impact and significance the case has
had, or will likely have in future Court decisions.' 3 Part VI will
conclude this note on Martinez and examine what the case's impact
will likely have on lower courts and future legislation.
14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Immigration Law
The Immigration Act of 1875 may signal the first of many
restricting statutes for classes of aliens in the United States.' 5 The
subsequent Immigration Act of 1882 continued the trend and
excluded more classes of aliens from admission into the United
States.'6 Subsequent Immigration Acts were enacted, which imposed
literacy tests and quotas to help ensure that the number of immigrants
imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed.
2004).
8. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
9. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (referring to Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678).
10. See infra notes 15-128.
11. See infra notes 129-156.
12. See infra notes 157-242.
13. See infra notes 243-290.
14. See infra notes 291-305.
15. Chelsea Walsh, Note, Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for
Judicial Review, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2857, 2859 (2005). The Act of 1875
specifically denied classes of convicts and prostitutes from being admitted into the
United States. Id.
16. Id.
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admitted remained limited.'7 The "National Origins Act" passed in
1924, posed another obstacle to immigration, by reducing the quota
of immigrants to two percent and requiring visas for travel.18
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, was then
passed to help consolidate the previous immigration laws, and has
undergone several amendments.19  The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) was established by the INA of 1952 and
the Attorney General was given certain powers.20 One of the INS'
main duties was to help with the process of providing benefits to
aliens under the U.S. immigration laws.2 ' Since the Immigration Act
of 1952, there have been several changes to the Act in subsequent
years.22
One major change has involved the transferring of some powers
to the Department of Homeland Security's United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS).2 3 The United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the United States Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) each respectively investigate and enforce
immigration laws, and protect the borders.2 4
B. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in
actual service, in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject, for the same offense, to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
17. Id.at 2860-61. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 limited
immigrants by imposing a literacy test while the Immigration Act of May 19, 1921
set a quota of immigrants who could be admitted into the U.S. Id.
18. Id. at 2861.
19. Id. at 2862.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2863.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2863-64. The transfer occurred on March 1, 2003. Id.
24. Id. at 2864.
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
The Fifth Amendment has proven to be important in immigration
law largely due to the use of the word "person", which has been held
to mean those who are present in the United States and not just
United States citizens.26 The Due Process right of aliens has been a
key issue in immigration law and was a major issue in Clark v.
Martinez.2
7
The Fourteenth Amendment has also been important to
immigration law in that it states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.28
The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fifth, is important to
immigration law because it uses the language "any person" in the
United States should be given "equal protection."" Both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments have helped establish that aliens who
are present in the country have due process rights and are afforded
the protections of the Constitution, even though they may not be
American citizens.30  These rights are probably instrumental in
helping to define the statutes and procedures that have been put into
place to ensure that an immigrant's rights are being protected.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).
26. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896).
27. See Shaugnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955) and Plyer v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 25-29.
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C. Immigration and Removal Proceeding Statutes
Ordinarily, once an alien is deemed inadmissible and is ordered
to be removed, the Secretary of Homeland Security is required to
remove the alien from the United States within ninety days. 3 1
Accordingly, unless an alien "is found 'clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted," he must go through "removal proceedings to
determine admissibility.- 32 However, the Secretary is permitted to
detain an inadmissible alien after the ninety day period for a time
reasonably necessary to achieve removal.33 This section of the
statute applies whether or not an alien has been admitted into the
United States. 34 The post-removal statutes apply to aliens ordered
removed, which includes:
inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have
violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and
aliens removable for certain national security or
foreign relations reasons, as well as any alien 'who
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a
risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal.' 35
In the Zadvydas v. Davis case, the dissent pointed out that the
Attorney General was given a structure to follow in exercising the
option of detaining an alien past the removal period.36 First, there
would be a post-custody review.37  Secondly, an alien would be
allowed to present "relevant information in support of [his] release",
and the director would have the discretion to allow for a personal
interview with the alien.38 After the ninety days have passed, there
would be an "initial custody review within three months of [the
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2001).
32. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 373 (2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) (2001)).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2001).
34. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 571-73 (2005).
35. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. (See 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (Supp V. 1994) and
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (2001)).
36. Id. at 722-23.
37. Id. (according to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2001)).
38. Id. (according to § 241.4(h)(1)).
alien's] transfer."39 If the decision is that the alien will remain in
detention, a panel consisting of two INS officers will review the case
and make recommendations to INS headquarters. 40 Accordingly, the
INS must give the alien thirty days written notice of the reviews, and
must allow the alien to submit information to be considered at the
review.4' During the review, in accordance with the statute, an alien
will be entitled to assistance by a "representative of his choice. 4 2
Additionally, an alien must be given a copy of the NS' decision,
which will include a brief reason for continued detention.43
During the review, certain factors will be taken into
consideration." Amongst the factors the panel will consider are: "the
alien's disciplinary record, criminal record, mental health reports,
evidence of rehabilitation, history of flight, prior immigration history,
and [other] favorable factors such as family ties. 45  In order to
authorize an alien's release, the panel must find: that the alien will
not be violent, the alien won't "pose a threat to the community", and
the alien won't try and flee if released, or "violate the conditions of
release. 46 In particular, the alien has to prove "to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that he will pose no danger or risk of flight., 47
If in the end the panel decides not to release the alien, then it must
review the matter again within a year; and earlier if conditions
change.48
D. Habeas Corpus Proceedings and Historical Overview of
Immigration Case Law
A common aspect of immigration case law involves judicial
review and writs of habeas corpus. The U.S. Supreme Court also
acknowledged that aliens are entitled to due process under the Fifth
39. Id. (according to § 241.4(k)(2)(ii)).
40. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (according to § 241.4(k)(2)(iii)).
41. Id. (according to § 241.4(i)(3)(ii)).
42. Id. (according to § 241.4(i)(3)(i),(ii)).
43. Id. (according to § 241.4(d)).
44. Id. at 683.
45. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (referring to § 241.4(f)).
46. Id. (referring to § 241.4(e)).
47. Id. at 683-84 (citing § 241.4(d)(1)).
48. Id. at 684 (citing §§ 241.4(k)(2)(iii),(v)).
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Amendment for deportation proceedings, but the Court
acknowledged that detaining aliens during this process is valid.49 In
Shaugnessy v. Pedreiro, the Court stated that "[t]he legislative
history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and the 1952
Immigration Act supports respondent's rights to full judicial review
of this deportation order." 50 In Pedreiro, under the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, an alien was ordered removed.51 He tried to
have the deportation order removed and claimed that he had been
forced to incriminate himself.52 The Court held that there was a right
to judicial review of a deportation order, which could be done besides
habeas corpus and that the remedy which was sought was
"appropriate" in this case. 53
In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court explained that "habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention,
and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest., 54
Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the only way
an alien could contest his or her deportation order was to bring a writ
of habeas corpus in district court.55 The Court also pointed out that
historically in immigration law the terms "judicial review" and
"habeas corpus" have had "distinct meanings." 56 The Court also
pointed to the importance of "congressional intent., 57
In Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, there was an alien
who had been lawfully admitted into the United States and who
subsequently left the United States, and upon return was refused
49. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 306 (1993) and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see
also, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (deciding that even if an alien
proves there is no evidence they will not appear for their hearing, detention of
aliens during deportation proceedings is valid).
50. Shaugnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955).
51. Id. at 49.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 52.
54. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
55. Id. at 305.
56. Id. at 311.
57. Id. at 314.
admission.58 He was left on Ellis Island indefinitely and detained
there because no other country would accept him.59 The Court held
that the alien's detention did not violate the Constitution.60  The
Court pointed out that the "[c]ourts have long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control.",6 1 The Court in Zadvydas distinguished this
case because the alien's departure in Mezei made him have to seek
reentry into the US, and therefore the alien's presence on Ellis Island
was not reentry into the US, but the equivalent of being "stopped at
the border." 62
In the past, "territorial distinctions" in immigration law were
vital.63 In the twentieth century immigration law would classify
aliens as either physically inside the United States or not physically
present within the United States.64 If the United States had stopped
an alien at the border and did not want to permit them to enter, then
"exclusion" proceedings would take place. 65 In contrast, if an alien
had entered into the United States with approval, then the United
States would commence "deportation" proceedings to send the alien
to another country.66 The distinction between the two different
58. Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207-10 (1953).
This case is considered the "precedent for the issue of indefinite detention."
Thomas Pulley, Note, Nowhere To Go: The Indefinite Detention of Inadmissible
Aliens in Benitez v. Wallis., 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2005). In Mezei, the
Court had permitted an "'excludable alien' to be indefinitely detained." Id. at
1176.
59. Pulley, supra note 58, at 1176.
60. Id. at 216. The Court concluded by commenting on Congressional
authority, saying "[w]hatever our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on
which it rests, respondent's right to enter the United States depends on the
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative
mandate." Id.
61. Id. at 210.
62. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
63. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three
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groups was of particular significance, because they were treated very
differently: aliens subject to "deportation" were given greater
protections and rights than those who were subject to "exclusion"
proceedings.67 The rationale behind this different treatment was
attributed to the presumption that aliens who had already crossed the
border might have greater ties to the United States than those stopped
at the border.68 In the case of the Mariel Cubans from 1980, many
were paroled into the United States, but others were not and could
not be returned to Cuba.69 As a result, many of them have lived in
the United States for almost twenty-five years, but are still
considered stopped at the border. 70 This result and others like it is
why the "entry doctrine is often called the entry 'fiction'." 7'
In Crowell v. Benson, the Court decided that when an Act of
Congress raises "serious doubt" about its constitutionality, then the
Court will first decide if an interpretation of the statute is possible
where the question of constitutionality may be avoided. 72 Then in
Zadvydas, the Court held that a construction of the statute which
avoids invalidation would be the best interpretation of congressional
intent.73 The Court in Zadvydas concluded that in order for the
statute to be in compliance with the Constitution's demands, the post-
removal detention period had to be reasonably necessary to ensure
the alien's removal from the United States, and that no indefinite
detention was allowed.74
Other cases also demonstrate basic principles and rules which
govern aliens in the United States and immigration law. In Kaplan v.
Tod, the Court found an immigration law distinction between aliens
who had effected entry into the United States and those who had
never effected entry into the United States. 75 Kaplan involved an
67.Id.
68.Id.
69. Weisselberg, supra note 63 at 818.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
73. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
74. Id.
75. Kaplan v. Todd, 267 U.S. at 230. In 1996, the term "inadmissible" was
introduced by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA). Thomas Pulley, Note, Nowhere To Go: The Indefinite Detention of
appeal from a dismissal of habeas corpus. 7 6 The petitioner was trying
to argue that she was a U.S. citizen who was unlawfully detained for
deportation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.7 7 The petitioner
had been born in Russia and had arrived in the United States when
she was thirteen.78  She was supposed to be deported, but her
deportation was suspended after the European war began and she
remained on Ellis Island until June 1915.79 The Court, in looking at
this case, explained that those stopped at Ellis Island are "still in
theory of law at the boundary line and [have] gained no foothold in
the United States."80
In Leng May Ma v. Barber, the Court found that an alien who
was "paroled" into the United States had not actually entered into the
United States.81 The petitioner in Leng May Ma came to the U.S in
1951, saying that she had U.S. citizenship because her father was a
U.S. citizen. 82 She was first placed in custody but was later released
on parole in August 1952.83 After she was unable to prove her claim,
she was excluded and before she was deported she claimed that she
would suffer at the hands of the existing government in China.84 She
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.85  The Court in its
deliberations pointed out that Congress did not intend that parole
Inadmissible Aliens in Benitez v. Wallis, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1165, 1167 (2005).
The classification of "inadmissible" refers to those aliens who do not possess a
legal right to enter the U.S. Id. In contrast, the term "deportable alien" refers to
those who had obtained legal status to be in the United States but have had that
standing revoked. Id. Currently, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) permits "[a]n alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in
the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General [to be] inadmissible." Id. at 1177. As a result of this, the current statutes
tend not to focus as much on the distinction between aliens who have never gained
entry from those who may have gained entry illegally. Id. at 1177-78.




80. Id. at 230.
81. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1958).
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would equal entry and admission of the alien into the United States.86
The Court held that parole status did not entitle the petitioner to
benefit from a statute which would allow the Attorney General to
withhold deportation of an alien who was "within the United States"
if the alien could face physical persecution. 87
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court found that
certain constitutional protections which are granted inside the United
States, did not apply to aliens outside of U.S. borders.88 Verdugo-
Urquidez involved the U.S. government obtaining an arrest warrant
for a Mexican citizen thought to be involved in smuggling drugs into
the United States. 89  After he was arrested, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents along with Mexican officials searched
his residences in Mexico and seized documents in the process.90 The
respondent made a motion to suppress the evidence by claiming it
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment which covers
searches and seizures. 91 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to searches and seizures which were conducted by U.S.
agents when the property was not located inside the United States,
and when it was owned by a nonresident alien.92
In Plyer v. Doe, the Court decided that once an alien did enter the
United States, they were given protection under the Due Process
Clause because the clause applies to all "persons" within the United
States, including aliens regardless of whether their presence in the
United States is lawful, or unlawful.93 Plyer v. Doe was a suit in
Texas which was brought on behalf of children of Mexican origin
who could not prove they had entered the United States legally.94
The suit was brought because of the children's exclusion from public
schools and the denial of public education to them. 95 The Court held
that the State could not deny the children public education, and that
86. Id. at 188.
87. Id. at 190.
88. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).




93. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982).
94. Id. at 206.
95. Id.
once aliens had entered the United States they were to be afforded
constitutional protections.
96
In Wong Wing v. United States the Court held that the Due
Process Clause protects an alien who is subject to a final deportation
order and found a statute which imposed a year of hard labor on
aliens who were subject to deportation, to be unconstitutional.97 In
Wong Wing four people were brought before a court and charged as
being Chinese aliens who were illegally in the United States.98 They
were sentenced to hard labor for sixty days and afterwards were
ordered to be deported from the United States to China.99 A writ of
habeas corpus was issued.'00 The Court found that punitive measures
could not be imposed on these aliens because all "persons" in the
United States were granted constitutional protections.' 0' While these
cases are relevant to the background of Clark v. Martinez, the case
which the Court uses to support its decision in Martinez is the
Zadvydas v. Davis case outlined below.
96. Id. at 210-30.
97. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). The Court in
Wong Wing found that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment did apply to "all persons within the territory of the United
States." Thomas Pulley, Note, Nowhere To Go: The Indefinite Detention of
Inadmissible Aliens in Benitez v. Wallis, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1165, 1178-79 (2005).




On its face, § 123 l(a)(6) does not inflict punishment on an easily
identifiable group. The country does need the ability to restrain
the freedom of those who try to gain entry into the United States
illegally or have already gained entry and need to be removed.
However, the application of the law can cause problems. The
conditions and length of confinement of liberty can definitely rise
tothe level of punishment. Without narrowing interpretations or
revision, the statute leaves the door open for such problems.
Thomas Pulley, Note, Nowhere To Go: The Indefinite Detention of
Inadmissible Aliens in Benitez v. Wallis, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (2005).
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E. Zadvydas v. Davis and § 1231 (a)(6): Precedent to Clark v.
Martinez
§ 123 1(a)(6) provides:
(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed
(6) Inadmissible or criminal aliens
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182 of this title, removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to
be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the
terms of supervision in paragraph (3). 102
In Zadvydas, the Court interpreted § 1231 (a)(6) to authorize the
detention of aliens who were admitted into the United States, only for
a time "reasonably necessary" to remove them.'0 3 The Zadvydas
case actually was comprised of two cases decided together by the
Court. 10 4 Zadvydas was a resident alien who had Lithuanian parents
and who was born in a German camp for displaced persons. 05 Due
to his criminal record, Zadvydas was ordered to be deported, but both
Lithuania and Germany refused to accept him because he was not a
citizen of either country. 106 Attempts to deport him to his wife's
home country also failed. 0 7 He filed a habeas corpus action under
28 U.S.C. § 2441 after the removal period had expired and he
remained in custody. 0 8 The District Court granted the writ because
it felt that the government would never remove Zadvydas, and that
this permanent detention would result in a violation of the
102. 8. U.S.C.A. § 123 1(a)(6) (2005).
103. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 371. "Reasonableness" would be measured in
terms of "assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal." Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 699. If it turns out that removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then the
court should hold that continued detention would be unreasonable and is no longer
covered by the statute. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
104. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686.




Constitution. 0 9 The Fifth Circuit reversed, saying that there was no
constitutional violation because the eventual deportation of Zadvydas
was never possible, but that it was fine as long as good faith efforts to
remove him continued." 10
The other petitioner in the Zadvydas case was Kim Ho Ma."'
Kim was a resident alien who had been born in Cambodia and was
ordered removed because of an aggravated felony conviction.
112
After his removal period expired, Kim filed under § 2241 when he
was detained further.1 3 The district court ordered his release since
there was no realistic chance he would be removed, because
Cambodia did not have a repatriation treaty with the United States.
The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the decision.' 14 The U.S. Supreme
Court then had to decide whether the post-removal statute, 8 U.S.C. §
123 1(a)(6), authorized the Attorney General to detain an illegal alien
indefinitely once the removal period expired, or if the alien could
only be detained as "reasonably necessary" to ensure his removal. 1
5
The Court held that § 2441 allows constitutional challenges to
post-removal detention and that there are no restrictions on judicial
review of removal decisions." 6  The Court held that continued
detention after the expiration of the removal period had to be
reasonable, based on the time it would take to remove the alien from
the United States, and that indefinite detention was not permitted."l 7
The determination of what constituted a "reasonable time" would be
subject to federal court review. 118 The Court assumed that after a six
month period of detention there is the possibility the alien may never
109. Id.
110. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
111. Id.
112.Id.
113. Id. "§ 2441 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for
statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention." Id. at
688.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 682.
116. Id. at 678-79.
117. Id. at 679.
118. Id. at 682.
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be removed, and the government must rebut this assumption." 19 In
the end, both Zadvydas' and Kim's cases were vacated and
remanded. 120
The dissent argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101 said that:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182 of this title, removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to
be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the
terms of supervision in paragraph (3). 121
The dissent argued that Congress had given the Attorney General
discretion to detain an alien who had been ordered removed, even if
the detention was "beyond the removal period."' 122  The dissent
accused the majority of refusing to interpret the statute literally and
refusing to offer an alternate interpretation.2 3  The dissent also
pointed out that Congress had anticipated the hardships that aliens
could face if they could not be repatriated, and therefore created §
1231(a)(7), which allows the alien to be eligible for employment in
the United States.' 24 The dissent also emphasized that the six month
detention period was invented by the courts to protect the
community, and not to negotiate the alien's return. 125
Despite its decision, the Court in Zadvydas conceded that
"[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country
119. Id. The sixth month period does not mean that every alien will have to be
released after six months has passed, because an alien can be held in confinement
until he is able to show there is no likelihood of him being removed in the future.
Id. at 701.
120. Id. at 681.
121. Id. at 706 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 708.
125. Id. The safety of the community allows for the periodic review of the
alien's detention in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2001). Id. An alien's criminal record should
indicate the risks they could pose to the community. Id. at 714.
would present a very different question." 2 6 In 2005, the Court was
presented with this very question in an immigration case.' 27 This
issue was handed to the Court in Clark v. Martinez and in making its
decision, the Court frequently referred back to its decision in
Zadvydas.128 The facts of Martinez are outlined below, followed by
the Court's holding and reasoning.
III. FACTS
The Court began by referring to the Palma v. Verdeyen case for
the Mariel Boatlift facts. 129 125,000 Cubans arrived in Florida in
1980 in a small fleet of boats due to a situation in which the Cuban
authorities had told criminals to leave for the United States or remain
in prison.' 30  Upon arrival to the United States about twenty-five
thousand of them admitted some criminal history, and out of those,
two thousand had backgrounds which required further detention. 13'
Most of the immigrants from this incident were paroled under INA 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) after sponsors were found for them.' 32 As for
the 2,000 Cuban immigrants who were detained, they were sent to
various federal prisons to await proceedings against them and were
not eligible for parole. 33 The Attorney General announced that the
government would return the immigrants ineligible for parole back to
Cuba during the summer of 1981, but the Cuban government refused
to take them back. 34
Sergio Suarez Martinez and Daniel Benitez both arrived in the
United States from Cuba on June 1980 as members of the Mariel
Boatlift.135 Both men were paroled into the United States according
126. Id. at 682.
127. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 374 (referring to Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982)
and Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1290 (1 1th Cir. 2003).




134. Id. at 102.
135. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 374.
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to the Attorney General's authority under § 1182(d)(5). 13 6 Up until
1996, the federal law had permitted Cubans to be paroled into the
United States in order to adjust their status and to become lawful
permanent residents after one year.' 37 However, both men were not
candidates for this because when they applied, both had prior
criminal convictions in the United States.' 38 Martinez had sought
adjustment in 1991 but had been convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon in Rhode Island, and of burglary in California. 13 9 Benitez
had sought adjustment in 1985 but had been convicted of grand theft
in Florida. 4 ' In addition to this, both men were convicted of other
felonies after their adjustment applications were denied.' 41 Martinez
was convicted of petty theft with a prior conviction, assault with a
deadly weapon, and attempted oral copulation by force.' 42 Benitez
was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, armed burglary of
conveyance, carrying a concealed firearm, unlawful possession of a
firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, and unlawful
possession/delivery of a firearm with an altered serial number.
143
In December of 2000, Martinez's parole was revoked by the
Attorney General and INS took him into custody, resulting in the
commencement of removal proceedings. 144 The immigration judge
found him inadmissible because of his prior conviction under §
11 82(a)(2)(B) as well as for lack of sufficient documentation under §
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), therefore ordering that Martinez be removed to
Cuba. 145 Martinez did not appeal. 146 Martinez was then detained by
the INS beyond the 90 day removal period, and remained in custody
136. Id.





141. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 374.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 374-75.
144. Id. at 375.
145. Id.
146. Id.
until the District Court ordered his release, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
147
Benitez had his parole revoked in 1993, and the INS initiated
removal proceedings against him.' 48  In December of 1994, an
immigration judge determined that Benitez was excludable, and
ordered him deported under § § 11 82(a)(2)(B) and
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).149 Benitez did not seek further review. 5 ° The
INS took Benitez into custody and detained him beyond the ninety
day removal period. 15 In September of 2003, Benitez found out he
was eligible for parole, contingent on completion of a drug abuse
treatment program, completed the program, and was released from
custody to sponsoring family members while his case was pending. 5 2
Both Benitez and Martinez filed petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge their detentions beyond
the ninety day period.'53 The District Court ordered release of
Martinez under acceptable conditions to the INS and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. 5 4 The District Court found that in Benitez's case,
removal would not occur in the "foreseeable future," but denied his
petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.' 55 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. 5 6
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A. Application of Zadvydas v. Davis
As mentioned above, the Court's decision in Zadvydas is of
particular importance to the Court's decision in Clark v. Martinez.15 7
In Zadvydas, the Court was concerned with the interpretation of §






153. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 376.
154. Id. at 377.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
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1231(a)(6) and held that it authorized the detention of aliens who
were admitted into the United States, only for a time "reasonably
necessary" to remove them. 158 The Martinez decision expanded the
Court's holding in Zadvydas by deciding that the interpretation it had
adopted in Zadvydas was also applicable to inadmissible aliens.1
59
B. Majority Opinion: Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion of Martinez, closely
examined Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 160  In examining this
provision, the Court held that the Secretary could detain an
inadmissible alien after the 90 day removal period expired as long as
it was "reasonably necessary" to achieve removal. 161 The Court went
on to explain that the "may be detained beyond the removal period"
language of § 1231(a)(6) was applicable to both aliens who were
admitted into the United States and those who were not.' 62  The
majority opinion clearly stated that this interpretation of § 1231 (a)(6)
also pertained to "inadmissible aliens."'163 The Court explained that §
1231(a)(6) applied to three categories of aliens: "(1) those ordered
removed who are inadmissible under § 1182, (2) those ordered
removed who are removable under § 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or
1227(a)(4), and (3) those ordered removed whom the Secretary
determines to be either a risk to the community or a flight risk."'
' 64
158. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686, 689.
159. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386.
160. Id. at 377.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 386.
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section
1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined
by the [Secretary] to be a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of
supervision in paragraph (3). Id. at 377.
164. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386.
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Justice Scalia also examined the Court's decision in the Zadvydas
case. 165 In Zadvydas, the Court had held that the Attorney General
(now the Secretary) had the ability to detain aliens deemed
removable under § 1227(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), or (a)(4) for as long as was
"reasonably necessary" to effectively remove them from the United
States. 166 In examining the language of the statute closely, the Court
held the word "may" would imply that the Attorney would have
"discretion" but not "unlimited discretion" - the discretion would
apply to the statute's purpose for removing the alien.' 67 The Court
stressed that once it was determined that removal was "no longer
reasonably foreseeable" the alien could not be detained any
further.' 68 The Court had deemed that six months was a reasonable
period to carry out the alien's removal from the United States.
69
After the expiration of the six month period, the alien would be
eligible for conditioned release but had to demonstrate there was "no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future."'
170
The main issue identified by the Court in the Martinez case was
whether the application of § 1231(a)(6) as applied in the Zadvydas
case, also covered aliens "ordered removed who are inadmissible
under [§] 1182.,, 171  The Court concluded that § 1231(a)(6) as
interpreted by the Court would apply to all three categories of aliens,
because if the Court were to give a different meaning to the words
"may be detained beyond the removal period" for each category, it
would be creating a statute rather than interpreting the statute. 1
72
The Court took into account the dissenting opinion in the
Martinez case and concluded that the dissent misunderstood the
Court's application in the Zadvydas case. 173 The issue in Zadvydas
had been whether removable aliens could be held indefinitely, and
165. Id (referring to the Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001)).
166. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 378 (citing Zadvydas, 583 U.S. at 699).
169. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378.
170. Id. at 378 (citing Zadvydas, 583 U.S. at 701).
171. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378.
172. Id. at 378-79.
173. Id. at 379.
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the Court held that they could not be.' 7 4 The Court explained its
decision by saying that "the statutory text provides for no distinction
between admitted and nonadmitted aliens" and that therefore "it
results in the same answer." 175 Justice Scalia pointed out that the
dissenting opinion in Zadvydas actually supported the majority's
decision in Martinez because the dissent in Zadvydas argued that:
[T]he majority's logic might be that inadmissible and
removable aliens can be treated differently. Yet it is
not a plausible construction of § 1231 (a)(6) to imply a
time limit as to one class but not to another. The text
does not admit of this possibility. As a result, it is
difficult to see why '[a]liens who have not yet gained
initial admission to this country would present a very
different question.'176
The dissent in Zadvydas had voiced concern that the release of
Mariel Cubans and other inadmissible illegal aliens would be a
consequence of the majority's interpretation, and the majority did not
refute this. 177
Justice Scalia went on to explain that while the government
argued that statutory concerns which were present in Zadvydas were
not present for aliens such as the defendants in Martinez, who had
not been admitted to the United States, it did not justify the Court
giving a different meaning to the statute to aliens such as the
defendants. 178  Justice Scalia also examined the concept of the
"canon."' 179 Justice Scalia explained that the canon allows courts to
avoid constitutional questions and is a means of giving effect to
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 379-80 (referring to Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Zadvydas, 583 U.S. at 7 10-11).
177. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380.
178. Id. "It is not at all unusual to give a statute's ambiguous language a
limiting construction called for by one of the statute's applications, even though
other of the statute's applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern." Id.
179. Id. at 381-82.
Congress' intent; and when a litigant utilizes the canon he is
vindicating his own statutory rights and not the rights of others.' 80
The dissent relied on the decision in Crowell v. Benson, where
the Court had held that while a statute could be read to bar judicial
review altogether, it could also be subject to a narrower reading.181
The Court in that case chose the narrower reading in order to avoid
the constitutional questions that a preclusion of judicial review would
have raised.1 82 The dissent in Martinez had also relied on other cases
and Justice Scalia in the majority opinion addressed these assertions.
In pointing to Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. and Jinks v.
Richland County, the dissent was trying to establish that § 1367(d)
had two meanings, and that this line of reasoning was "equivalent to
the unlimited-detention/limited-detention meanings of § 1231 (a)(6)
urged upon us here."' 83 The majority in Martinez explained that this
case was different from the others because the defendant aliens in
this case were asking only that § 1231(a)(6) as it was interpreted in
Zadvydas be applied to their case as well.' 84 Justice Scalia stressed
that "[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only
when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is
found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon
functions as a means of choosing between them."'185 Justice Scalia
emphasized that in Zadvydas, the statute had not been read to avoid
approaching a constitutional limit, but the text of the statute had been
read in regards to its purpose, and the rule was that the Secretary
180. Id. (referring to the canon the Court explained: "It is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts... The canon is thus a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it."). Id.
181. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 382-83 (referring the Court's decision in Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
182. Id. at 382-83.
183. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 383 (referring to the Court's decisions in Jinks v.
Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) and Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
534 U.S. 533 (2002)).
184. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 385.
185. Id. (referring to examples given in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1998) and United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
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could detain aliens only as long as needed to effectuate their removal
from the United States.' 86
The majority addressed the government's argument that §
1182(d)(5)(A) could permit continued detention of aliens.' 87 Upon
examination of the statute, the Court found that the provision did not
authorize indefinite detention. 88 The government had also expressed
fears that the safety of U.S. borders could be compromised if
inadmissible aliens were to be released into the United States who
were not removable.' 89 The Court's response to this was that if this
was a fear that Congress had, then they could properly address it.1 90
The Court explained that it could not permit unlimited detention
186. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 385.
187. Id. at 385-86.
188. Id.
The [Secretary] may ... in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe
only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the
United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded
as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such
parole shall, in the opinion of the [Secretary], have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States.
Id. at 386 n.7.
189. Id.
190. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386 n.7.
That Congress has the capacity to do so is demonstrated by its
reaction to our decision in Zadvydas. Less than four months after
the release of our opinion, Congress enacted a statute which
expressly authorized continued detention, for a period of six
months beyond the removal period (and renewable indefinitely),
of any alien (1) whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable and
(2) who presents a national security threat or has been involved
in terrorist activities. Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), § 412(a), 115
Stat. 350 (enacted Oct. 26, 2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1226a(a)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. 1I)).
Id. at 386 n.8.
because it could lead to a dangerous presumption that judges could
"give the same statutory text different meaning in different cases."',91
In conclusion, the majority in Martinez decided that since the
government failed to give a reason why the time to carry out removal
of an inadmissible alien would take longer then the six month period
recommended in Zadvydas, the six month period would apply to this
case.'92 The defendants in this case had already been detained six
months past the time when their final removal orders had been
issued.19 3 In addition to this, the government had not indicated there
was a substantial likelihood that the defendants would eventually be
removed.' 94 Therefore, the Court granted both petitions for habeas
corpus and affirmed the judgment of the 9 th Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the 1 1 th Circuit, and remanded both cases.195
C. Concurring Opinion: Justice O'Connnor
In her concurring opinion Justice O'Connor gave the government
some encouraging advice, stating that even under the current statutes,
the government could still detain inadmissible aliens for longer than
the six-month period after their removal had been ordered. 196 She
explained that the Court's presumption in Zadvydas had been just
that, a "presumption."' 97 Under § 123 1(a)(6), if the government was
able to show that a time period extending beyond the six-month
period was "reasonably necessary" to remove the inadmissible alien,
then further detention would be lawful under the statute and the
holding in Zadvydas.198
Justice O'Connor also suggested that there may be other means
under statutes in which the government could detain aliens whose




194. Id. There were no longer repatriation negotiations going on between the
U.S. and Cuba, so therefore the petitions for habeas corpus should have been
granted. Id.
195. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386-87.
196. Id. 387-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 387.
198. Id.
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presence within the country nonetheless could pose a security risk.' 99
Under §§ 1226(a)(3) and (a)(6), the Secretary of Homeland Security
could detain an alien who threatens national security and the United
States community. 200  Also, if it is proven that the Secretary has
"reasonable grounds to believe" an alien has engaged in a dangerous
activity or terrorist activity, the alien may be detained under the
statute.201
Along with these other statutes, Justice O'Connor made it clear
that even though aliens would be entitled to release under the Court's
ruling in Martinez, they were still subject to conditions of supervised
release.20 2 If an alien failed to comply with the conditions of his
release, he could be subject to criminal penalties which could include
further detention. 203 Justice O'Connor emphasized this right of
Congress to regulate by quoting from Zadvydas: "We nowhere deny
the right of Congress . . . to subject [aliens] to supervision within
conditions when released from detention, or to incarcerate them
where appropriate for violations of those conditions. '204 Overall,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence pointed out that even though the
Court's ruling had entitled inadmissible aliens who had been detained
beyond the removal period with no foreseeable removal in sight to
release, the government still had tools in their hands to regulate and
monitor the release of those aliens.20 5
D. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Thomas (Chief Justice Rehnquist
joins in Part I-A)
Justice Thomas began by explaining that § 1231 (a)(6) permitted
an alien who had been ordered removed by the Secretary of
Homeland Security to "be detained beyond the removal period. 206
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 387 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (Supp. II
2000)).
202. Id. (referring to the statutes 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2005) and C.F.R. §
241.5 (2004)).
203. Id. at 387-88 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (2005)).
204. Id. at 388 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 695).
205. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 397-88.
206. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2005)).
Justice Thomas pointed out that in the Zadvydas decision, the Court
had interpreted this provision to mean a "reasonable" amount of time
regarding the detention of aliens because an "indefinite" detention
would lead to "serious constitutional concerns" for the Court.2 °7 The
Court had also conceded that aliens who were inadmissible to the
United States would pose a different matter.20 8  The majority in
Martinez decided that the distinction mentioned in the Zadvydas case
was really irrelevant because § 1231 (a)(6) applied in the same way to
all three classes of aliens. 20 9 Justice Thomas stressed that since the
Martinez case could not be reconciled with the Court's decision in
Zadvydas, Zadvydas should be overruled, and therefore he
dissented.210
The dissent began by interpreting the majority's decision in the
Zadvydas case. 21' The dissent argued that the Court's decision in that
case was driven by the "lowest common denominator principle. 212
Due to the constitutional concerns that indefinite detention could
raise, the Court decided to read the statute to permit the Attorney
General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security) to detain admitted
aliens as long as "reasonably necessary" to carry out their removal.213
The Court in Zadvydas did not decide whether the holding would
also apply to aliens who had not been admitted into the United States,
but did acknowledge that there were constitutional distinctions





211. Id. (referring to the majority's opinion in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 679 (2001)).
212. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 387-89.
The majority strains to recharacterize Zadvydas because it thinks
that "[i]t is not at all unusual to give a statute's ambiguous
language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute's
applications, even though other of the statute's applications,
standing alone, would not support the same limitation." ... In
other words, it claims, "[t]he lowest common denominator, as it
were, must govem."... I disagree.
Id. at 392. (referring to the Court's decision in Zadvydas) (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 389. (referring to § 1231(a)(6)).
214. Id. at 389-90.
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Justice Thomas urged the Court in Martinez to adopt the two-step
procedure it had used in the Zadvydas case and to apply it to the
Martinez case. 215 Using this approach the Court would first ask if the
statute was ambiguous and if it was, then it would ask whether one of
the possible interpretations of the statute would raise constitutional
doubts when applied to the alien's case.216 The dissent argued that
while the Court may have concerns about creating a statute rather
than interpreting one, there should not be a single and unchanging
meaning of § 123 1(a)(6).217 Instead, the application of the detention
period authorized should depend on the circumstances of the alien's
removal and the type of alien being removed.218
The dissent was bothered by the majority's attempt to
"recharacterize" the decision made in Zadvydas.219 It argued that the
Court was simply using the "lowest common denominator" in
making its decision, without giving support for its rationale. 220 The
dissent pointed to Jinks v. Richland County used by the majority, and
said that in Jinks the Court conceded that it reached its holding after
looking at constitutional doubts that were at issue.221 The dissent
argued that as in the Jinks case, the Court in Martinez should look at
the constitutional concerns that justified applying the ruling made in
Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens.222 The dissent also referred to
Salinas v. United States where the Court had rejected the idea that a
federal bribery statute should be read to avoid constitutional doubts
because there was "no serious doubt about the constitutionality" of
the statute when applied to that case.223 In Salinas, there were no
constitutional issues being contended, only the statute, so the Court
was mistaken in believing that Salinas was a "rejection of a
constitutional argument on its merits. 224




219. Id. at 392.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 393. (referring to Jinks v. Richmond County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003)).
222. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 393.
223. Id. (referring to Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997)) (emphasis
added by the Court).
224. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 393.
Justice Thomas also stressed that the Court's use of the "lowest
common denominator" principle was at odds with the history of the
canon of avoidance, which could lead to "mischievous
consequences."22 5 The dissent argued that the majority was speaking
of the modern canon of avoidance, where in order to avoid
constitutional questions, the courts would construe ambiguous
statutes.226 In contrast, the traditional avoidance canon involved a
doctrine where courts would choose a constitutional reading of the
statue over an unconstitutional one - not simply reading the statute to
avoid the constitutional issues.227 The dissent urged the Court to
apply constitutional adjudication when deciding whether a statue
would raise "serious constitutional doubts. 228
The dissent also pointed out that because § 1231 (a)(6) was given
such a narrow reading in Zadvydas, that the statute limited the
Executive's power to detain aliens not admitted to the United States
for an indefinite period of time, although indefinite detention in some
cases could be constitutional. 229  The dissent relied on Leocal v.
Ashcroft, which permitted "lenity" to apply to a statute "so long as
they have some criminal applications."230 The Court also referred to
other cases regarding lenity and stated that Zadvydas presented
constitutional doubt as to whether § 1231(a)(6) applied to himself
and not a hypothetical application to aliens.231 The dissent said that it
did not want a court applying a canon of constitutional doubt to a
statute that was clear on its face.232
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. The dissent also pointed out that the "lowest common denominator
principle" would permit a way around black-letter law for constitutional facial
attacks: that a litigant is generally not allowed to "attack statutes as constitutionally
invalid" due to other litigants or facts. Id. at 396.
228. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 397. "Moreover, the reason that courts perform
avoidance at all, in any form, is that we assume 'Congress intends statutes to have
effect to the full extent the Constitution allows."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
229. Id
230. Id. (referring to Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12, n.8).
231. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 397-98. (dissenting opinion also referred to United
States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992) and McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
232. Id. at 399.
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In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court held the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) did not divest district courts' jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in habeas corpus actions which were filed by criminal aliens
trying to challenge removal orders.233 Since the case had only
involved criminal aliens, the dissent argues that one would think that
noncriminal aliens would have to go to the court of appeals to
petition for review rather than "sue directly under the habeas
statute. 234 But in practice, lower courts using the Court's "lowest
common denominator" principle have held differently in that they
have "entertained noncriminal aliens' habeas actions challenging
removal orders. 235  Justice Thomas responded to this by saying:
"[t]he logic in allowing noncriminal aliens, who have a right to
judicial review of removal decisions, to take advantage of
constitutional doubt that arises from precluding any avenue of
judicial review for criminal aliens.., escapes me. 236
The dissent concluded by stating that the Court had been wrong
to give the Zadvydas case a stare decisis effect.237 Justice Thomas
wrote that the case was wrong on both its statutory and constitutional
analysis.238 He argued that just because Congress can overturn the
Court's cases by statute, did not mean that the Court could not
overrule a statutory precedent that was wrong. 239 The dissent also
stressed that Congress in enacting the statute had not meant to limit
the Secretary's ability to detain aliens. 240 Congress had enacted §
1226(a)(6) in 2000 in response to the Zadvydas case, but is only
operated within Zadvydas' boundaries. 241 Therefore, Justice Thomas
233. Id. at 400 (referring to INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327-36 (2001)).
234. Id. at 399-400. (referring to St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 335).
235. Id. at 401. (referring to Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 214-15
(C.A. 3d. 2001)).
236. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 400-01.
237. Id. at 401.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 402-03.
241. Id. at 404.
Section 1226a(a)(6) authorizes detention for a period of six
months beyond the removal period of aliens who present a
national security threat, but only to the extent that those aliens'
removal is not reasonably foreseeable... Yet Zadvydas conceded
concluded that in the Martinez case he would have affirmed the
Judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit.
242
V. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE
After the Zadvydas decision, there were relevant concerns over
the safety and welfare of the general population. In Demore v. Kim, a
decision after Zadvydas, the Court examined a defendant's habeas
corpus petition challenging "the statutory framework that permits his
detention without bail. 2 43  The Court closely looked at Congress'
concerns and found out that the concerns were justified by statistical
evidence. 21 One study estimated the fastest growing group in prison
was criminal aliens, who constituted around 25% of prisoners in
federal prisons.245  Another study had suggested it would take
twenty-three years for the INS to deport "every criminal alien already
subject to deportation" and that even if criminal aliens were
successfully deported, there was a high likelihood they would return
illegally.246  Other problems the INS faced were that illegal aliens
were taking up immigration opportunities which should be available
that indefinite detention might not violate due process in "certain
special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances ... where a special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs
the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding
physical restraint.'... Moreover, Zadvydas set a 6- month
presumptive outer limit on the detention power. ... Congress
crafted § 1226a(a)(6) to operate within the boundaries Zadvydas
set. This provision says nothing about whether Congress may
authorize detention of aliens for greater lengths of time or for
reasons the Court found constitutionally problematic in
Zadvydas.
Id. (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 404.
243. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
244. Id. at 518. "[T]he Chief Justice concluded that rules of immigration are
intertwined with national security concerns, and since detention during removal
proceedings is part of immigration rules, due process standards that would be
unacceptable for citizens are legitimate." Eli J. Kay-Oliphant, Considering Race
in American Immigration Jurisprudence, 54 EMORY L.J. 681, 694 (2005).
245. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518.
246. Id.
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to legal immigrants, and that if deportable criminal aliens remained
in the United States they would often commit more crimes before the
INS had a chance to remove them.247 Congress had evidence that
part of this problem was exacerbated by the fact that the INS could
not detain criminal aliens while their deportation proceedings were
taking place. 248 If they were released, 20% of criminal aliens subject
to deportation would not appear at the removal hearings and this
further hampered the process of removal.249 In light of these studies
and statistics, it is not surprising there are those who are greatly
concerned over the impact that the decision made in Martinez will
have on society and safety in the United States.
The United States has often been characterized as a safe haven
and place of escape for weary and persecuted immigrants.
Throughout much of its modern history, the United States has
experienced several waves of immigrants from various countries at
different times. Despite its desire to have an open-door policy, the
United States faces various threats and concerns for its safety.
In the post-September 1 1th era, the United States is faced with
protecting its borders and protecting its citizens from outside threats.
The events of September 1 Ith have had an impact on U.S.
immigration policy, as well as current legislation from U.S. leaders.
Recently, the Congress enacted the Patriot Act and other such
measures to ensure safety. The Court's decision in Martinez will
undoubtedly affect the fate of many inadmissible aliens who have
been detained beyond the six month removal period, but who cannot
be removed for political or other reasons.'
In the majority opinion Justice Scalia suggested that the nation's
border concerns can be addressed by Congress. 251 After Martinez,
the government is no longer permitted to detain after the period
beyond the removal order has expired, if removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable. 2  The decision will have an impact on all
three categories of aliens: (1) those who were legally admitted, (2)
247. Id.
248. Id. at 519.
249. Id.
250. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371.
251. Mingda Zhao, Development in the Judicial Branch: Clark v. Martinez, 19
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 195, 196 (2004).
252. Id.
those who arrived illegally, and (3) those who were never technically
allowed in and who were stopped at the border. 253 For many years
the Court had maintained a distinction between aliens who had been
stopped at the border and those who had entered legally or illegally -
the Martinez case makes this distinction less clear.254
Some believe that the decision in Martinez may have come out in
favor of inadmissible aliens currently in custody of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).255 It has been estimated that there are
currently about 2,270 inadmissible aliens in the custody of the
DHS.256 However, this decision by the Court may not have been a
complete victory for these inadmissible aliens because the Court had
"hinted that it would uphold a revision of the relevant statute which
would allow indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens., 257 It is
estimated that during the Mariel Boatlift approximately 122,000
Cubans were paroled in the Spring of 1980 and Summer of 1981.258
Although for now it seems that the DHS will have to release
inadmissible aliens who have been detained beyond the removal
period with no foreseeable removal, the Court in Martinez seemed to
make itself very clear that if the statute had made a "clearer
distinction" between the groups of aliens, then the outcome could be
very different. 259 Therefore, any gain in protections the inadmissible
aliens may have made, could easily be taken away if there are
revisions in the existing statute which make Congress' intent clearer
on the issue.260
After September 1 1th, there were various responses by the
government and many of them had a great impact on U.S.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Jose Javier Rodriguez, Comment, Clark v. Martinez: Limited Statutory
Construction Required By Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for
Inadmissible Immigrants from Indefinite Detention, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
505, 505-06 (2005).
256. Id. at 506.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 507.
259. Id. at 518-19.
260. Id. at 520.
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immigration law.261  Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act,
signed by President Bush on October 26, 2001 .262 "The Act provides
express statutory authority to detain for additional six-month periods
beyond the ninety-day removal period if 'removal is unlikely in the
reasonably foreseeable future,' but only if release 'will threaten the
national security of the United States or the safety of the community
or any person.' "263 The Act also provides that every six months the
Attorney General would review certification and that the Act could
be challenged on federal habeas corpus grounds.264  Despite the
security concerns the United States now faces, the Court's decision in
Clark v. Martinez may be a sign that the "Court [will] not [be]
paralyzed by claims of national security, '265 This is important
because it seems that while the executive branch and legislative
branch of government may be greatly concerned about the current
uncertainty of terrorist threats, the judicial branch may not be
succumbing to possible pressure by these two other branches of
government.266 The Court, for now, has seemed to take the position
that if an actual threat does exist, then the government may act on it.
However, the Court has refused to give the government unbridled
discretion in detaining inadmissible aliens by using the terrorist threat
excuse.
267
However, even though the Court in Clark v. Martinez may have
found that national security argument was not a compelling reason to
warrant extended detention of non-removable inadmissible aliens in
that case, there are still challenges that many detainees face.268 In the
261. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three
Years After September 11: A New New World?, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 815, 824
(2005).
262. Id. at 830.
263. Id.
264. Id. While challenges may be made on federal habeas corpus grounds, all
of the appeals are required to go through the District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id.
265. Id. at 860.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Joren Lyons, Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings:
Challenging the Applicability of Demore v. Kim to Vietnamese and Laotian
Detainees, 12 ASIAN L.J. 231 (2005).
case of aliens who are ordered removed but cannot be repatriated to
their home countries they are often faced with a difficult choice.
269
"Presented with the 'choice' between (1) accepting an order of
removal with the limited possibility of deportation at some unknown
future date, or (2) enduring continued detention for as long as they
resist the government's attempts to obtain a removal order." 2
70
Some have worried that this choice leads the government to
pressure aliens who have been ordered removed, but who cannot be
removed, to accept removal orders.2 71 The government's strategy for
doing this would be beneficial for the government because (1) if an
alien fought to retain their permanent resident status, they would
prolong their detention, and (2) since the aliens cannot be removed,
accepting a removal order would not have any real consequences.
272
However, the circuit courts may be giving aliens in this position
some hope.273
In Ly v. Hansen, the Court found that a reasonableness
requirement should apply for an alien held in detention for removal
proceedings who could not be removed from the United States, even
if he was ordered removed.274 As a result, the Sixth Circuit held that
the Zadvydas case should apply to situations where removal would
not be "achievable" rather than having Kim apply.275 While this may
have provided some hope for aliens who were not really removable,
the events of September 11, 2001 and the changes in immigration
laws may pose more challenges for aliens who are in this position. 276
Besides the September 11th response, there was also a response
by the government after the Zadvydas decision came down.277 It was
clear that the government was not happy with the Court's decision
269. Id. An example of aliens who would be faced with this dilemma are aliens
from Laos and Vietnam because the United States does not have repatriation
agreements with those countries and cannot carry out a removal order. Id.
270. Id. at 232.
271. Id. at 239.
272. Id. at 239-40.
273. Id. at 240.
274. Lyons, supra, note 268 at 240 (referring to Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263
(6th Cir. 2003).
275. Id. (referring to Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 and Kim, 538 U.S. 510).
276. Id. at 244.
277. Carey, supra note 1, at 29.
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because soon after the decision, Attorney General John Ashcroft
released a statement which explained that there was an urgency to
deport aliens because "their history of serious crime makes them a
threat to our community. ' ' 278 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) was not pleased with this statement because it felt that
Ashcroft was making all indefinite detainees look like "dangerous
criminals." 27
9
Ashcroft soon developed a response to the Zadvydas decision and
made his first priority in the matter to pressure the home countries of
the inadmissible removable aliens to accept the aliens back and
repatriate them.2 80 The second response was to see if any of the
aliens in detention had sentences they had not served yet, or whether
more charges could be brought against these aliens in custody.2 8' In
the process of exploring various options in the July 19 th
Memorandum from Ashcroft, he created "two loopholes in
Zadvydas."282 Two possible reasons for continued detention that
would still be permitted under Zadvydas were "special
circumstances" or "reasonable efforts to remove the alien [were] still
underway." 283 It appears that the government is trying to come up
with a way in which it can still detain these inadmissible non-
removable aliens, while still operating within the framework the
Court has set up in the Zadvydas case.
This interpretation of Zadvydas has had different effects in the
lower courts.284 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York chose to deny a petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus when it determined that the alien's removal from the United
States "appear[ed] to be imminent. '285 In contrast, the United States
278. Id. at 30-3 1.
279. Id. at 31.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 33.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 34-38.
285. Id. at 35. (referring to Lawrence v. Reno, No. 00 Civ. 4559 (LAK), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9953 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001). In the Lawrence case, the court
did acknowledge that he had been in custody for a long time and that part of the
delay in his case was due to "administrative error." Id. Despite this, it held that
District Court for the District of Rhode Island found that the
petitioner did not fall into the loophole and granted the writ.286 The
District Court of Massachusetts also refused to let a petitioner fall
into the loophole and held that the writ would be issued if the
petitioner had not been repatriated within the sixty day period.287
The results of these cases demonstrate that there is indeed a
difference in how the lower courts are interpreting these possible
"loopholes" and if they are permitting them to be utilized. This
difference in interpretation may pose more questions and problems in
the near future as the government continues to find ways to protect
national security and U.S. borders while trying to operate within the
Court's rulings.
After Clark, the government and American public are faced with
a growing dilemma. Mainly, what is to be done with inadmissible
aliens who have been ordered removed but who are found to be non-
removable from the United States. Often, the inability to remove
aliens who have been ordered removed are due to political and
repatriation reasons.288  While Ashcroft may have found two
potential loopholes in the Zadvydas decision, this solution may not be
indefinite. 289 Another possibility is that Congress could go back and
clarify §1231(a)(6) so that Congress' intent would be clear, and the
Court would not have to interpret the statute. 29' Overall, it seems that
since removal might be "imminent", Lawrence could not escape the Zadvydas
loophole.
286. Id. (referring to Sylvanus Emmanuel Williams, Sr. v. INS, No. 01-043
ML., 2001 WL 1136099 (D.R.I., Aug. 7, 2001). Williams was from the Bahamas
and the court found that he did not fall into the loophole because he had already
been in custody for twenty months. Id. It found that the government had shown no
signs or offered a time period when his deportation would take place. Id.
Therefore, it found that "continued detention of Williams is unreasonable,
excessive, and 'shocks the conscience' in violation of the substantive component of
the Fifth Amendment's due process clause." Id. (quoting Sylvanus Emmanuel
Williams, Sr. v. INS, No. 01-043 ML., 2001 WL 1136099 (D.R.I., Aug. 7, 2001)).
287. Id. at 36. (referring to Zhou v. Farquharson, No. 01- 1139 1-RWZ, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18239 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 19, 2001).
288. Joren Lyons, Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings:
Challenging the Applicability of Demore v. Kim to Vietnamese and Laotian
Detainees. 12 ASIAN L.J. 231 (2005).
289. Carey, supra note 1, at 30-33.
290. Mingda Zhao, Current Developments: Development in the Judicial
Branch, Clark v. Martinez, 19 GEO. IMMIGR L.J., 195, 196 (2004).
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the U.S. government is faced with a dilemma, but it has tools it can
use to correct it and protect the American public if it feels that is
what is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clark v. Martinez in effect did expand the Court's holding in
Zadvydas v. Davis.291 The ruling extends the holding in Zadvydas to
permit inadmissible aliens to be released if they are held beyond the
removal period with no foreseeable opportunity to be removed from
the United States. 292 Although this may be deemed as a victory for
inadmissible aliens ordered removed, it is a very fragile victory.
Measures have been enacted since the Zadvydas decision to create
loopholes where further detention of aliens can take place. 293
Undoubtedly, human rights advocates and other organizations, as
well as aliens themselves will be watching closely to see what
becomes of the inadmissible non-removable aliens who are currently
in custody.
The government seems to have legitimate concerns of public
safety and welfare. There seem to be statistics and evidence that
aliens who entered the United States illegally and who have
committed crimes will likely act out again in the future.294 There are
also statistics which have shown that a substantial number of inmates
currently in custody are aliens, many of which may also have been
aliens who were never formally paroled into the United States or who
have entered the United States illegally.295  However, as
demonstrated in the Martinez case, the Court will not always find that
this is a sufficient justification for continued detention.296
In Martinez, the Court decided the case based on a statutory
reading of the text.297 It has left the door open for Congress to take
care of the issue by stating that Congress does possess the power to
291. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001).
292. Martinez, 543 U.S. 372-73.
293. Id.
294. Carey, supra note 1, at 31.
295. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
296. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371.
297. Id. at 380.
amend the statute.2 98 Since the constitutional issues of the case have
not been addressed, this may be something the Court will have to
decide in the future. If Congress does decide to change or amend the
statute, then the constitutionality of that statute may also come before
the Court. It will be interesting to see if Congress will take steps to
further protect the American public from the release of inadmissible,
non-removable aliens who have committed crimes. It may also be
interesting to see if anyone tracks the progress of the inadmissible
non-removable aliens who are released back into society.
The Martinez case is one which must balance the two competing
groups of human rights and public safety.29 9 There is evidence which
has been presented to suggest that aliens do comprise a substantial
part of the U.S. prison population. 30 0 If an inadmissible removable
alien cannot be removed due to political or other reasons, then
according to Martinez, they will have to be released. While not all
aliens in this category pose a threat to society, there is a legitimate
fear that once aliens who do pose a threat are forced to be release,
they will again commit crimes and cause a danger to public safety.
If the U.S. public and its leaders are genuinely concerned for the
safety of the American public, then the Court's decision in Martinez
should inspire them to take action. However, it may be that the
release of these inadmissible non-removable aliens may have little or
no effect on American society at large. On the other side of the
debate, it is reasonable to suspect that the families of the victims of
the aliens who committed these crimes will undoubtedly be upset
about the release of these aliens back into society.
For some, the Court's decision in Clark v. Martinez may not
come as a surprise. The decision may be viewed as simply extending
the Court's ruling in the Zadvydas case to inadmissible aliens who
298. Id.
299. Jose Javier Rodriguez, Comment, Clark v. Martinez: Limited Statutory
Construction Required By Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for
Inadmissible Immigrants from Indefinite Detention, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
505, 521-22 (2005). "In the current political climate where the line between
matters of national security and matters of immigration is often blurred, the
urgency of strengthening protections of the rights and liberties of immigrants only
grows." Id.
300. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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have no future hope of being removed from the United States.3 '
However, there may be some who believe that the fact that the aliens
were inadmissible, as opposed to admissible, does make a
fundamental difference in whether they should be permitted to be
released back into the American public. Despite any personal views
or objections that people may have, it must be pointed out that even
inadmissible aliens are afforded the protections of the U.S.
Constitution.30 2 As mentioned earlier in this note, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments do ensure that even inadmissible aliens
should be afforded due process rights. 30
3
Presently, it seems that Ashcroft and the INS have found certain
loopholes within the framework to operate in until further action is
taken.30 4 However, there is also evidence that there may be a certain
amount of uncertainty amongst the lower courts.30 5 For now it
appears that there have been no major challenges to the Court's
decision in Martinez, but it does not mean that challenges will not
occur in the future. The challenge may come from the government in
the form of a court case, or it may come in the form of new or
amended legislation. Although the Martinez decision may be seen by
some as a victory for the many inadmissible non-removable aliens
who are currently in custody, it is unclear whether the victory will
last. It appears that at least for now, the American public and aliens
who are currently in jeopardy under the statute will have to wait
together to see what the future holds.
301. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 372-73.
302. See U.S. CONST. amend. V., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
303. See infra notes 25-30.
304. Carey, supra note 1, at 30-33.
305. See infra notes 284-87.
